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A clear view of costs ‘of and incidental to’:  Mio Art Pty Ltd v Macequest (No.2) Pty Ltd 
[2013] QSC 271 
This case offers helpful guidance on a number of practices relating to costs that remain 
common but not required under the UCPR. Report by Sheryl Jackson. 
Costs orders – implications where costs are reserved – scope of order for costs ‘of and 
incidental to’ – success on some issues – application to strike out pleading – whether 
predisposition for indemnity costs 
In Mio Art Pty Ltd v Macequest (No.2) Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 271 Jackson J provided considered 
analysis of several aspects of costs law. 
His Honour regarded various orders which are commonly sought or made as reflecting 
practice that is inappropriate or unnecessary under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(Qld) (UCPR). 
Facts 
On 19 August 2013, Jackson J made orders disposing of six cross applications made by the 
parties (Mio Art Pty Ltd v Macequest Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 211). The parties took the 
opportunity provided to them to file written submissions on costs. A number of interesting 
questions relating to the costs arose as a result. 
Reserved costs 
Rule 698 of the UCPR provides: 
“If the court reserves costs of an application in a proceeding, the costs reserved follow the 
event, unless the court otherwise orders.” 
Jackson J noted that he had made an order on 31 January 2013 that the costs be reserved. 
His Honour said that he had not intended by that order to deal with the costs of the 
applications generally, but the costs thrown away by the adjournment. His Honour said that, 
in proposing an order that the applicant pay the costs of the application, he did not propose 
any specific order for reserved costs because of UCPR r698. In his Honour’s view, this rule 
was intended to make it unnecessary to make a specific order dealing with reserved costs, 
unless those costs were not to follow the order for costs of the application. He proceeded 
(at [5]): 
“That interpretation means that the practice followed under previous rules of court that 
reserved costs must be specifically dealt with does not generally apply in making an order 
for costs of an application under the UCPR.” 
His Honour accepted, however, that the scope of the particular order for reserved costs was 
not as clear as it could have been. Accordingly it was appropriate to order that the costs of 
each of the applications should include costs which were reserved on 31 January. 
Costs ‘of and incidental to’ the application 
It was submitted for some of the defendants that the form of the order should include the 
costs ‘of and incidental to’ the application. 
Jackson J referred to cases which had considered orders in this form, including Warley 
Hospital Inc v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2011] VSC 145 and Queensland 
Building Society Authority v Mahoney [2012] QDC 226. His Honour noted that the view, 
taken from the statutory contexts in other jurisdictions seemed to be that the addition of 
the words ‘and incidental to’ extended the ambit of an order for costs ‘of’ an application to 
costs incurred as part of the preparation for litigation. His Honour then examined whether 
that view was justified. 
As the power to award costs is purely a creature of statute, Jackson J considered the 
relevant statutory text. This included the power to order costs as now conferred by s15 of 
the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld)(CPA), and the provisions of UCPR chapter 17A which in 
general terms take up the power conferred by the CPA. His Honour noted in particular that 
UCPR r678 applies chapter 17A to costs payable under an order of the court. 
He also referred to the definitions of ‘assessed costs’ and ‘costs of the proceeding’ in UCPR 
r679. It was significant, in his Honour’s view, that express provision was already made for 
costs before the start of the proceeding in preparing for the proceeding or in relation to 
settlement negotiations to fall within the ‘costs of the proceeding’. 
His Honour concluded that it was undesirable for the court to further endorse a practice of 
making orders for costs ‘of and incidental to’ an application, and he declined to make such 
an order. His Honour identified three reasons for his conclusion. In summary: 
1. The cases on which the distinction between an order for costs ‘of [a proceeding]’ on 
the one hand and costs ‘of and incidental to [a proceeding]’ on the other were said 
to arise did not give any clear meaning to the difference in scope between the two 
formulations. 
2. To introduce the practice in orders for costs made under s15 of the CPA and UCPR 
chapter 17A would seem to depend on acceptance of the proposition that an order 
made under them that a party ‘pay the costs of the application’ to another party 
does not include proper costs of preparation for the application. His Honour 
regarded that as a proposition which was not supported by the provisions of chapter 
17A. 
3. The text of chapter 17A evinces a clear intention to avoid the need to make some of 
the forms of order previously made, as a matter of course, under the prior statutory 
provisions. There is no reference in any part of the text of chapter 17A to costs which 
are ‘incidental’. There were some references to such costs outside the context of 
chapter 17A, but these did not lead to a conclusion that orders for costs made under 
s15 and chapter 17A ought to follow that terminology. 
Jackson J made it clear, however, that he intended that the orders he made for the ‘costs of 
the application’ extended to any costs “actually, necessarily and reasonably incurred” in 
relation to the application, including costs of preparation. 
Costs when success on some issues 
One of the costs orders to be made related to the plaintiff‘s application for leave to bring 
the proceeding on behalf of the 20th defendant under s237 of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth). The plaintiff argued that the costs order should reflect that it succeeded on some of 
the disputed questions relevant to that application. 
Jackson J referred to the general restriction in UCPR r680 on the entitlement to recover 
costs, and to UCPR r684 in relation to costs of a question or part of a proceeding, which 
expressly permits the court to declare what percentage of the costs of the proceeding is 
attributable to the question or part of the proceeding to which the order relates. His Honour 
also repeated observations he had made in relation to these two rules in Aion Corporation 
Pty Ltd v Yolla Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 216. That included reference to authorities in 
which it was suggested that a rough apportionment of costs “intelligently made” leads to a 
fairer result that may have been reached through the taxation of ‘issues’ prior to the UCPR.  
These observations were found to be applicable to the application for leave under s237. 
After examination of the circumstances relating to that application, it was concluded that it 
was reasonable that the order for costs be limited to 70% of the successful respondents‘ 
costs. This order reflected the respondents’ success yet recognised that on some of the 
issues their opposition added to the costs to an extent by which they should not all be 
recoverable. 
It was also necessary to make costs order in relation to applications by the respective 
defendants or groups of them for the costs of applications to strike out the statement of 
claim and dismiss the proceeding. Although successful on the event of an order to strike out 
the statement of claim, these applications did not succeed on the event of an order to 
dismiss the proceeding. It was submitted for the plaintiff that in these circumstances costs 
should be limited to 75% of the relevant successful defendant‘s costs. 
That submission was rejected. Jackson J noted it was not uncommon for orders for strike 
out and dismissal to be sought in one application. Here the plaintiff had through successive 
iterations of the statement of claim insisted that it was entitled to maintain the statement 
of claim in substantially the same form, despite clear opposition based on the same grounds 
on which the defendants were successful. Jackson J found it was not overreaching in these 
circumstances for the defendants to apply for there to be an end to the proceedings, 
although they were ultimately unsuccessful on those applications because some of the 
plaintiff’s causes of action were viewed as viable or potentially viable. His Honour also noted 
that little overall time was spent on the dismissal aspect in the hearing of the applications. 
He concluded that the plaintiff should pay the respondent’s costs of the applications to 
strike out and dismiss. 
Basis on which costs assessed 
The final question was whether the plaintiff should be ordered to pay the costs of the 
applications to strike out and dismiss on the indemnity basis. 
UCPR r171(2) provides: “The court, at any stage of the proceeding, may strike out all or part 
of the pleading and order the costs of the application to be paid by a party calculated on the 
indemnity basis.” 
The plaintiff submitted that it should not be ordered to pay the costs of these applications 
on the indemnity basis. It referred to Gunns Ltd v Marr (No.3) [2006] VSC 386 at [5], where 
the discretion to order indemnity costs was said to be warranted only “where the losing 
party had misconducted itself in relation to the proceeding or where the institution of the 
proceeding was plainly unreasonable”. However, Jackson J did not accept that misconduct 
or unreasonableness in starting a proceeding constrained the exercise of the discretion to 
award indemnity costs under the UCPR. 
Jackson J then examined the purpose of UCPR r171. He said this was that a pleading which 
engaged one of the grounds for striking out a pleading should not proceed to engage the 
obligations of the opposite party to plead in response and to proceed to trial on the 
infringing pleading. His Honour found the interpretation which best achieved that purpose 
did not dictate that there be a greater disposition towards making an order for costs to be 
paid on the indemnity basis in the case of applications to strike out under UCPR r171 than in 
the case of other interlocutory applications, notwithstanding the specific reference in the 
rule to the indemnity basis. 
It was accordingly necessary to consider the factors which would inform the exercise of the 
discretion to order costs on the indemnity basis. As part of that examination, Jackson J 
referred to his own conclusions in his reasons for judgment on the application to strike out 
and dismiss ([2013] QSC 211 at 273) that the plaintiff “has persisted in the face of clear 
opposition to its excessive pleadings of fraud and a number of causes of action against a 
number of the defendants which are not viable or not viably pleaded”. He was satisfied that 
it was appropriate in the circumstances to order the plaintiff to pay the costs of the 
applications to strike out and dismiss on the indemnity basis. 
 Comment 
In the course of his judgment, Jackson J provided helpful advice which should be noted by 
practitioners about a couple of other practices which remain common but are not required 
under the UCPR. 
One of these is that practitioners regularly seek an order that costs be assessed. As his 
Honour observed, it was necessary under an earlier statement regime that there be an 
order for costs. However, under the UCPR it is expressly provided that costs may be 
assessed without an order for assessment having been made if the court orders a party to 
pay another party’s costs: UCPR r686(a). 
The other practice referred to is that of seeking an order that costs be assessed on the 
standard basis. This is unnecessary because there is express provision in the UCPR requiring 
a costs assessor to assess on the standard basis unless there is on order of the court 
providing otherwise: UCPR r702(1). 
 
